Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Speech

Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Speech
Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Speech
Analyzing China’s Escalation After Taiwan President William Lai’s National Day Speech Top

    This page is part of a series tracking and analyzing Chinese responses to developments in the Taiwan Strait. Click here to explore all the content in the series.

    On October 10, 2024, Taiwan President William Lai followed a long-held practice of delivering a speech marking the National Day of the Republic of China (commonly referred to in Taiwan as “Double Ten Day”). Past speeches have rarely been monitored closely by the international community, but Lai’s remarks were watched intently because China took the unprecedented step to respond to Lai’s May 2024 inauguration address with large-scale military drills, and the National Day speech was the first major speech Lai delivered since his inauguration.

    Beijing again demonstrated its preference for relying on coercive measures. Four days after Lai’s speech, China conducted large-scale military exercises around Taiwan and several outlying islands, named “Joint Sword-2024B.” China’s maritime law enforcement forces also conducted unprecedented patrols around Taiwan. This ChinaPower feature tracks and analyzes China’s activities during the October 14 exercises and two weeks before and after the exercises.

    Key Findings

    China’s Joint Sword-2024B exercises showcase six critical features of Beijing’s approach toward Taiwan: 

    1. China continues to normalize the use of military exercises and law enforcement operations to respond to what it views as provocative non-military political activities by Taiwan. This marks the second time China has held large-scale, high-profile military exercises and coast guard patrols near Taiwan during Lai’s administration, and the fourth such occurrence since China began the practice in August 2022.1 In each case, the most prominent measure China used against Taiwan was its military exercise. Non-military measures played a supporting role.  

    How Beijing Perceived Lai’s National Day Speech

    This is the first time China has staged high-profile, large-scale activities in response to a National Day speech by a Taiwan president. China has staged more limited exercises around Double Ten Day. In 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced a night-time joint amphibious landing exercise near the coasts of Fujian and Guangdong provinces, but these were not the large-scale exercises that have become the norm since August 2022.

    Official statements have made clear these exercises will continue. At a press conference, Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian stated, “‘Joint Sword-2024B’ is not a repetition of 2024A, but rather an intensified pressure against ‘Taiwan independence.’ Every ‘Taiwan independence’ will prompt the PLA to advance one step further until the Taiwan issue is completely resolved.” 

    China's Major Military Exercises Around Taiwan, Compared

    2. Chinese operations demonstrated growing coordination between the PLA and maritime law enforcement forces and the growing importance of the China Coast Guard (CCG). This showcased China’s intent to exercise for a range of scenarios, including a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan.  

    The Taiwan MND reported 12 CCG vessels around the main island of Taiwan as part of China’s announced patrol around the island. Our research, based on Chinese ships broadcasting automatic identification system (AIS) data, showed one additional CCG vessel around the main island of Taiwan, bringing the total to 13 CCG vessels around the main island.  

    These CCG vessels largely operated in and near the six announced Joint Sword-2024B exercise zones. Compared to the exercises in May, where CCG vessels only operated outside the announced exclusion zones around the Taiwan Island, the CCG movements this time traversed within the PLA exercise zones, which suggests the CCG is operating more closely with the PLA Navy. 

    Measures Short of Invasion

    How and why might China quarantine or blockade Taiwan? Our series of interactive reports examines these questions and explores the potential impacts on trade through the Taiwan Strait.

    Overall, our research found 16 additional CCG vessels operating within the vicinity of Taiwan beyond what was publicized by Taiwan MND: 

    • There were seven CCG vessels operating around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which is typically beyond the range reported on by Taiwan MND.
    • AIS data also showed four additional CCG vessels around Kinmen and three additional vessels around Dongyin. It is likely these CCG vessels were operating normally and not conducting “patrols” there, which is why Taiwan’s MND did not count these, but it is still notable that such a high level of CCG activity was visible.
    • CCG vessel 2303, which participated in joint patrol missions with the Russian coast guard, was also found to the northeast of the main island of Taiwan on October 14.
    • There were also differences in the location of vessels around Taiwan’s main island. A third CCG vessel was visible operating near Fleet 2102, but was absent from Taiwan MND counts. On the other hand, Taiwan MND reported three CCG vessels operating with Fleet 2901, but one of these did not show up in AIS data。

    Closer coordination between the PLA and maritime law enforcement indicates Beijing’s desire to level up their ability to conduct joint operations, such as a quarantine or blockade. In such scenarios, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces could take the lead in interdicting noncompliant civilian vessels, freeing up the PLA to focus on deterring outside military intervention. The CCG can also fill in gaps in PLA Navy vessel deployments, which can enhance Beijing’s overall domain awareness around Taiwan.


    3. Compared to prior large-scale Chinese military exercises, Joint Sword-2024B was designed to be short and sharp. It was the shortest of the four large-scale PLA exercises around Taiwan since 2022, lasting only about 13 hours according to the timestamps of official announcements. Similar to some of the prior exercises, the drills were not announced in advance.  

    The exercise had six declared exercise zones—one more than the Joint Sword-2024A exercises in May. However, they were noticeably smaller than the past announced exercise zones. Each announced exercise zone intruded into Taiwan’s contiguous zone, with some venturing very close to Taiwan’s territorial waters. 

    Joint Sword-2024B involved a bigger single-day deployment of forces than observed in any of the past three exercises. The drills saw the highest recorded single-day air incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), a record number of Chinese ships operating around Taiwan, and a higher number of sorties from China’s aircraft carrier than the three prior exercises. 

    The differences between the October 2024 exercise and prior ones showcase that Beijing can vary the scope and intensity of its activities based on its perceptions of Taiwan’s behavior and other domestic and foreign policy considerations. 


    4. Joint Sword-2024B was delayed compared to prior exercises, and it is possible that China weighed competing calculations in deciding on the timing of the drills. In August 2022, China immediately announced large-scale exercises upon Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and commenced the exercises two days later. In April 2023, China again commenced exercises within two days of Tsai’s return from her transit through the United States. In May 2024, China commenced its large-scale military exercises within 3 days of Lai’s inauguration speech. This time, the PLA waited four days before announcing and commencing a shorter-duration exercise.  

    A variety of factors could have contributed to the delay. There could have been bureaucratic differences within China over how to respond and what could be done in a timely manner. Parts of the Chinese government may have wanted to impose more non-military punishment against Taiwan and at a faster pace. In May, it took China’s Ministry of Finance eleven days after Lai’s inauguration speech to publicly announce it would reinstate tariffs on 135 items it imports from Taiwan.  

    On October 12, the Taiwan Affairs Office released a public statement that strongly encouraged relevant departments (China’s Ministry of Finance) to take additional measures against Taiwan based on China’s investigation of Taiwan’s “discriminatory” trade measures, but as of October 29, China’s Ministry of Finance has yet to take action against Taiwan after Lai’s National Day speech.  

    China’s economic situation could have also shaped Beijing’s decisionmaking regarding timing. On Saturday, October 12, China’s Minister of Finance Lan Fo’an and other officials convened a press conference to discuss fiscal measures the government would take to support the country’s ailing economy. That briefing was closely watched by both domestic and international investors and it dominated news headlines coming out of China over the weekend. Chinese officials may have delayed commencing PLA activities to minimize any unintended fallout that could heighten concerns about China’s economy. Economic policymakers may also have been so preoccupied with China’s domestic situation that they had limited bandwidth to work on reinstating tariffs on Taiwan in a timely manner. 

    It is also possible that decionmakers chose to wait longer to launch exercises to add an element of uncertainty and unpredictability.  

    5. China may have also wanted to sequence and time Joint Sword-2024B with other activities for maximum political and deterrent effect, showcasing that China has strong partners and influence. China’s exercise around Taiwan occurred before China wrapped up its concurrent joint naval and coast guard patrols with Russia. On the day of Joint Sword-2024B, Russian defense chief Andrey Belousov visited Beijing and met with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun. A day later, on October 15, Belousov met with Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission and vowed to strengthen their cooperation. This overlap with high-level China-Russia defense engagement and military exercises is new. This was not observed in any of the three prior large-scale PLA exercises around Taiwan.  

    Also on October 14, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi called the foreign ministers of Iran and Israel to discuss regional stability in the Middle East. This is not the first time that China has sought to engage with Iran during or around the time of a PLA exercise around Taiwan. Wang Yi called his Iranian counterpart during the August 2022 exercise and China hosted the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Beijing right before its April 2023 exercises. China likely seeks to showcase not only its relations with Iran, but that it contributes to global peace and stability even as Beijing engages in de-stabilizing actions in the Taiwan Strait.  

    Additionally, from October 14 to 17, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) hosted military attachés from Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Jordan, UK, Kazakhstan, Canada, Argentina, New Zealand, and more than fifty other countries to tour and visit Jiangsu and Jiangxi. U.S. and Japanese representatives were not invited. The timing of the exercises and this military diplomacy program may not suggest that they were related, as such a visit was likely scheduled and planned way ahead of the exercises. However, China’s willingness to hold Joint Sword-2024B on the same day a large number of foreign military attachés would visit the same theater command reflected China’s determination to escalate actions and possible intent to associate the countries of the visiting military attachés as backing the exercises. 

    6. There was heightened overall PLA activity before and after Joint Sword-2024B. This is likely to be the norm moving forward. PLA activity before and after the military exercise likely had multiple intended targets. Some of the heightened PLA activity beforehand likely sought to deter or prevent both Taiwan and the United States from engaging in what China views as provocative activities. Continued Chinese activity after the exercise likely aimed to reinforce punishments against Taiwan and the United States and demonstrate control over Taiwan.  

    Some of China’s missile activity before and after the exercise appeared particularly aimed at signaling to the United States. This included China’s late September test launch of a DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which is capable of striking targets in the continental United States. Additionally, Chinese leader Xi Jinping inspected a PLA Rocket Force brigade in mid-October that operates DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missiles, which can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads and reach U.S. military bases in Guam.  

    Click here to jump to a detailed timeline of other military activities.

    China’s “Joint Sword-2024B” Exercises

    At 5 am local time on October 14, the PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) announced the beginning of Joint Sword-2024B drills around Taiwan.  

    The official notice stated, “With vessels and aircraft approaching Taiwan Island in close proximity from different directions, troops of multiple services [are engaging] in joint drills, focusing on subjects of sea-air combat-readiness patrol, blockade on key ports and areas, assault on maritime and ground targets, as well as joint seizure of comprehensive superiority, so as to test the joint operations capabilities of the theater command’s troops.” It added that the drills are meant as “a stern warning to the separatist acts of ‘Taiwan Independence’ forces,” and said they were a “legitimate and necessary operation for safeguarding state sovereignty and national unity.”2

    Soon after, China’s MND released a map of the drills showing six zones around Taiwan, as well as smaller zones around the Taiwan-controlled outlying islands of Matsu, Dongyin, and Wuqiu. Unlike the Joint Sword-2024A exercises held in May, the outlying islands of Kinmen were not covered by an exercise zone. The exclusion of Kinmen from the exercises is notable and could indicate that Beijing feels it has already successfully routinized and normalized law enforcement activity there after a high tempo of CCG activity during Joint Sword-2024A and in the months before that.  

    The six main zones all encroached into Taiwan’s claimed “contiguous zone” but not cross into its territorial seas—a difference from May 2024 when the zones did extend into territorial waters. The official map also labeled six of Taiwan’s cities, suggesting each zone corresponds to a city. Notably, each city is home to one of Taiwan’s major ports or military bases, or both. This reinforced the idea that China was exercising how to quarantine or blockade Taiwan.   


    At 10 am local time, the ETC published a short animation titled “Tightening [勒]” that showed past PLA exercises around Taiwan since former U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022. The animation concluded with the visual of a fist transforming into a hammer and then into a sword on top of the island of Taiwan. 

    On the day of the exercises, Taiwan’s MND reported 153 PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan, of which 111 crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and into the western, southwestern, and eastern portions of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone ADIZ. This nearly doubled the previous single-day record of 56 aircraft (which was most recently met on July 10, 2024). 

    There was also a record number of maritime activity around Taiwan. A map released by Taiwan’s MND indicated a total of 34 Chinese vessels operating around Taiwan and its outlying island, including 17 PLA Navy ships and 17 “official ships.”3 This is the highest single-day sum to date after 31 vessels (15 PLA Navy and 16 CCG vessels) were reported on May 2024 during Joint Sword-2024A

    As part of the exercise, China positioned its first aircraft carrier Liaoning, as well as the Type 055 cruiser Anshan and Type 052D destroyer Urumqi to the east of Taiwan. This demonstrated the ETC’s cooperation with assets from other theater commands since all three vessels belong to the North Sea Fleet within the Northern Theater Command. It also sought to show that China has two carriers capable of operating around Taiwan since China last used its other carrier Shandong during April 2023 exercises.  

    According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Liaoning launched roughly 140 sorties, including about 90 sorties by fixed-wing planes and approximately 50 by helicopters. Unofficial reports suggest these sorties simulated strikes on two underground Taiwan military bases and air force bases on Taiwan’s east coast, as well as anti-submarine operations. Notably, this is higher tempo than in April 2023, when the Shandong launched approximately 120 sorties over a two-day period.  

    Unlike previous large-scale exercises, Joint Sword-2024B drills lasted only one day. The ETC announced the completion of the exercises at 6 pm local time on October 14. The following day, a typical number of PLA assets were reported around Taiwan.  

    China’s Unprecedented Law Enforcement Patrols

    In addition to the PLA’s drills, Chinese maritime law enforcement conducted unprecedented operations around Taiwan. These patrols exceeded expectations compared to the then-unprecedented coast guard and other law enforcement activity around Taiwan that accompanied Joint Sword-2024A.  

    On October 13, the day before the start of Joint Sword 2024B, it was reported that four CCG vessels were operating in the waters northeast of Taiwan. This reportedly included four CCG fleets led by CCG 2301 (Shucha II-class patrol ship), CCG 2304 (Zhaoduan-class patrol ship), CCG 2502 (Shuoshi II-class patrol ship), and CCG 2901 (Zhaotou-class patrol ship). Taiwan Coast Guard Administration released statements that abnormal CCG activities were observed past the Taiwan Strait median line in Taiwan’s northern, southwestern, and eastern waters. 

    On October 14, Chinese authorities announced that four formations of CCG ships (Fleets 2901, 1305, 1303, and 2102) were “conducting law enforcement patrols and circling Taiwan Island for control measures in the surrounding maritime areas.” It added that these operations “represent practical enforcement of the ‘One China’ principle over Taiwan Island.”  

    The CCG announcement included a map showing the four ship formations encircling Taiwan and moving in a counterclockwise direction. However, according to AIS data, the CCG formations did not entirely encircle the island. There was an area to the southeast of Taiwan that lacked a CCG presence. Additionally, CCG vessels largely patrolled within and near specified Joint Sword-2024B exercise zones; they did not move in a neat counterclockwise encirclement pattern as state media touted

    Nevertheless, this deployment marks an unprecedented level of CCG activity around Taiwan. During the May 2024 exercises, the CCG conducted “comprehensive law enforcement patrols” east of Taiwan, but Chinese state media indicated that the October 14 operations marked new breakthroughs. A CCTV article states that this time “the coast guard formation carried out a tour around the main island of Taiwan, realizing the expansion from one area in the eastern part of Taiwan Island to the entire area surrounding the island.” 

    In another unprecedented move, in the southeast exercise zone, the CCG deployed ship number 2901, one of two Zhaotou-class ships in its fleet. At 165 meters in length and a maximum displacement of 12,000 tons, this is the largest armed coast guard cutter in the world. Prior to this, the Zhaotou-class ships had been deployed in other places, such as the South China Sea, but not near Taiwan.  

    The CCG Wechat account also announced that the Fujian Coast Guard would be operating around Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands and Dongyin Island. China’s MND described the operations as “comprehensive law enforcement patrols,” and said the focus was on practicing operations including “verification and identification, boarding inspections, and control and expulsion [of vessels] to test rapid response and emergency handling capabilities.” As part of these activities, CCG vessels reportedly entered Taiwan’s claimed “prohibited waters” around Matsu for the first time. 

    Taiwan’s MND went on to initially report 12 “official ships” operating around Taiwan Island on October 14. In a map released by Taiwan’s MND, Chinese law enforcement vessels were operating in five of the six Joint Sword-2024B zones. Taiwan’s MND reported five additional CCG vessels around Taiwan’s outlying Matsu Islands (3 ships) and Dongyin Island (2 ships), for a total of 17 reported law enforcement ships—an all-time high in MND’s reported counts of non-PLA Navy vessels. 

    However, a broader look at law enforcement vessel activities suggests China deployed an even greater level of CCG forces than Taiwan reported. Many Chinese law enforcement vessels turned on their AIS transponders, allowing their movements to be publicly tracked.

    AIS data accessed through Starboard Maritime Intelligence shows 12 CCG vessels were active around the main island of Taiwan—the same number reported by Taiwan MND. However, it showed one less vessel operating east of Taiwan than MND reported and one additional vessel operating west of Taiwan that was not reported by MND.  

    Additionally, at least five vessels operated around Dongyin Island—three more than what the MND reported. AIS data also indicates four CCG vessels operated to some extent in the waters near Kinmen at the time of the exercises, but Taiwan MND did not report vessels there. It is likely the Taiwan MND did not report this activity because the CCG ships were deemed to be conducting normal operations in the area rather than participating in patrols around Kinmen.  

    On top of this, during the exercises, at least seven CCG vessels were operating in the waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which Japan administers and both Beijing and Taipei claim are part of their territory. Some of the vessels stayed before and after the Joint Sword-2024B exercises. On October 17, some CCG ships reportedly expelled a Japanese vessel from the disputed water. This was one of many instances of CCG ships taking action against Japanese vessels near the disputed island, but the proximity of the events may suggest that the CCG timed these particular actions in the disputed water to occur near the time of Joint Sword-2024B.  

    Finally, CCG vessel 2303 was also tracked to the northeast of the main island of Taiwan on October 14. The ship had previously been participating in joint patrol missions with the Russian coast guard.  

    AIS data only provides a baseline for the number of Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels around Taiwan. It is possible that not all CCG vessels had their AIS transponders on. CCG vessels have been spotted using satellite images despite there being no AIS record of their travels. The real number of maritime law enforcement vessels during the Joint Sword-2024B exercises could be even higher. 

    Timeline of Other Chinese Military Activities Before and After the Exercises 

    The PLA was already highly active in the weeks leading up to the announcement of Joint Sword-2024B. Since William Lai’s inauguration in May 2024, and the ensuing PLA Joint Sword-2024A exercises, there has been a marked and sustained increase in PLA activity around Taiwan. July 2024 saw 437 PLA aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ)—the second highest monthly total after August 2022. ADIZ incursions have remained elevated since then, potentially suggesting a new normal level of activity during Lai’s tenure.  

    In the month preceding Joint Sword-2024B, there was significantly heightened Chinese military activity. Some of this coincided with intensified PLA training in line with its annual training cycle. Other activities were likely higher than normal as China and Russia increased joint military exercises as part of deepening of bilateral ties and celebration of 75 years since their establishment of diplomatic relations. Still other PLA activities, such as its ICBM launch, were likely intended to deliver deterrent messages to multiple regional actors, including Taiwan.  

    Intensified China-Russia Joint Exercises

    • From September 13 to October 17, a formation of two CCG vessels, led by CCG 2303, joined two vessels from Russia’s coast guard to conduct joint drills and patrol missions. The two fleets joined forces in the North Pacific Ocean on September 21 and conducted drills and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas. On September 28, the joint fleet was spotted by the U.S. Coast Guard when they passed through the Bering Sea into the Arctic. The CCG announced the end of the joint patrol on October 17. This was the longest and most significant Chinese and Russian coastguard joint operation to date.
    • After the end of joint China-Russia “Beibu/Interaction – 2024” naval exercise in the Sea of Okhotsk on September 27, nine Chinese and Russian warships began to conduct joint patrols and exercises.  The joint patrol engaged in live fire drills and practiced anti-submarine warfare in the northwestern Pacific. On October 11, Japan’s MOD spotted a detachment of Chinese and Russian vessels from the joint naval patrols in the West Pacific, including one Type 055 cruiser, one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054 frigate, and one Type 903 replenishment ship from the PLA Nay and two Udaloy-class destroyers from the Russian Navy. The joint patrol approached the waters southeast of Okinawa on October 13 and separated, with the Chinese fleets moving west toward the Taiwan and the Russian destroyers moving northwest to cross the Miyako Strait. 
    Coast Guard Cooperation

    Want to learn more about growing China-Russia coast guard cooperation and its implications? Explore our guest-authored analysis here.

    Significant Aircraft Carrier Operations

    • From September 17 to October 1, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning, escorted by three Type 052D destroyers, one Type 055 cruiser, and one Type 901 fast combat support ship, sailed near the Japanese island of Yonaguni into the Western Pacific to conduct exercises, before returning southwest toward east Philippine waters and the Celebes Sea. The carrier group then sailed to China’s Hainan Island through the Sulu Sea, deviating from its conventional route of passing through the Miyako Strait between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako Islands or the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. Satellite imagery from October 8 later showed the Liaoning docked side-by-side with China’s second operational aircraft carrier, Shandong, at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island. This marked the first time the two aircraft carriers have been seen moored together at the same location.  
    • On October 13, the carrier Liaoning and one Type 055 (Renhai-class) cruiser were spotted traversing eastward across the Bashi Strait and arriving in the West Pacific on October 14. The ETC later confirmed that the carrier group participated in the Joint Sword-2024B drills. 

    ICBM and Other Rocket Launches

    • On September 25, a few days before China’s own national day on October 1, the PLA Rocket Force carried out a rare test-firing of a DF-31AG ICBM with a dummy warhead. It launched from Hainan island, passed over the Philippines exclusive economic zone and ADIZ, and landed near French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean. This was the first test fire of an ICBM into the Pacific Ocean since 1980.  
    • On October 10 at 9:50 pm, China launched a Long March 3B satellite carrier rocket from Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province that passed over Taiwan’s ADIZ into the West Pacific. The rocket was reportedly carrying a high-orbital internet satellite. This followed a pattern of China occasionally timing the launch of civilian rockets to fly near Taiwan during tense moments in cross-strait relations.  

    Other Military Activities

    • On the same day of Joint Sword-2024B, the PLA Rocket Force reportedly launched two missiles, likely two short-range DF-15B ballistic missiles, in an inland direction. This live missile activity was not reported by Taiwan MND as part of the PLA exercise against Taiwan. 
    • Also on the same day, Xi Jinping spoke at the All Army Work Conference on Military Theory and reemphasized the importance of modernizing military theory as a crucial part of China’s military modernization effort. The People’s Armed Police, which commands the CCG, participated. 
    • A day after Joint Sword-2024B, Xi visited Dongshan County in Fujian Province for an inspection, and he visited a memorial hall for the top official in Dongshan during the unsuccessful Kuomintang (KMT) campaign to retake the island in 1953. Since 1996, the PLA has conducted annual amphibious landing exercises in Dongshan county, with an increased focus on joint forces cooperation . The latest of these exercises was in September 2024, when the PLA deployed uncrewed drones and a large number of roll-on/roll-off cargo ships to transport landing troops. 
    • On October 17, Xi and CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia inspected a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) brigade in Anhui Province that operates DF-26 IRBMs. 
    • On October 21, the CCG and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) held their second high-level meeting in Beijing, hosted by CCG director general Yu Zhong and Roman Tolok, deputy director of the FSB Border Service and head of the Coast Guard Department. 
    • On October 22, China engaged in live-fire drills near Niushan Island in Pingtan County of Fujian Province. The drills were announced on October 21 and were supposed to occur from 9am to 1pm local time. These were likely in response to U.S. and Canadian warships transiting the Taiwan Strait on October 20, and were also part of an annual exercise conducted by the PLA near Pingtan and Dongshan County. 
    • On October 23, the Liaoning aircraft carrier sailed northward through the Taiwan Strait from the vicinity of the Pratas Islands. 
    • On October 23 at 9 am local time, a Long March 2C satellite carrier rocket launched from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan, passing Taiwan’s ADIZ. The rocket carried a Chinese military remote sensing satellite. 
    • On October 27, Taiwan MND reported that 19 PLA aircraft and an unknown number of Chinese warships carried out a “joint combat readiness patrol” near Taiwan. This was a part of regularly staged patrols China conducts around Taiwan but the first since Joint Sword-2024B. This combat patrol was in reaction to a $2 billion arms sale to Taiwan approved by the United States on October 25.4
    • On October 28, at 3 pm local time, more than four CCG vessels patrolled around Kinmen’s restricted waters. Taiwan’s coast guard reported that CCG 14512, CCG 14609, CCG 14603, CCG 14602, and other CCG vessels approached in four directions south of Kinmen and its island Lieyu. 

    Timeline of Chinese Non-Military Activities 

    In addition to the significant military and law enforcement activities listed above, China took several non-military measures to punish William Lai and other actors that Beijing deems as supporting “secessionist” efforts. China also engaged in political and policy actions that sought to “strengthened cross-strait exchanges” and incentivized cooperation between China and Taiwan. Click to expand the timeline to learn more.ChinaPower

    Timeline of Chinese Non-Military Activities, October 9-29


    Authors:
    Bonny Lin and Brian Hart